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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
EASTERN DIVISION
LORI QUIST,
Plaintiff,
vs. Case No. 10 C 475
SPIEGEL & UTRERA, P.A.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
Lori Quist has sued her former employer, Spiegel & Utrera, P.A. (“S&U”). She
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) for disability discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. 
S&U has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants 
S&U’s motion in part and denies it in part.
Quist is a forty-seven year old attorney and a former employee of S&U, a Florida 
legal services corporation. S&U is based in Miami and maintains satellite offices in 
other cities, including Chicago. It hired Quist to serve as the managing attorney of its 
Chicago office on March 21, 2006. Quist’s responsibilities as managing attorney 
included counseling clients on setting up business entities and preparing the documents 
necessary to do so. S&U’s president, Lawrence Spiegel, terminated Quist on June 18, 
2007.
asserts claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with
Background
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On or about February 12, 2007, Quist was diagnosed with cervical cancer and/or 
dysplasia. On two occasions following her diagnosis, she received medical treatment 
known as a “loop electrosurgical excision procedure” (“LEEP”). LEEP is used to treat 
persistent low-grade dysplasia and high-grade cervical dysplasia and results in the 
removal of cervical tissue. According to the American Congress of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, women who undergo LEEP may have difficulty becoming pregnant or 
maintaining a pregnancy. See Def.’s Mem., Ex. 8 at 2.
Quist contends that her supervisors at S&U began discriminating against her and 
treating her differently in various ways following her diagnosis. Specifically, Quist 
testified that prior to her diagnosis, Spiegel allowed her to make personal calls so long 
as she completed her work. During Quist’s trip to S&U’s Miami office in March 2007, 
however, Spiegel yelled at Quist for making personal phone calls and berated her on 
several other occasions. Quist’s trip occurred less than one month after her diagnosis 
and less than one week after her first LEEP treatment. Additionally, Quist testified that 
her supervisors consistently praised her work performance prior to her diagnosis but 
began reprimanding her thereafter. S&U counters that its employees expressed 
concerns about Quist’s performance on many occasions prior to her diagnosis.
Quist also asserts that she was subjected to harassment by S&U employees. 
Most of her allegations concern the behavior of Spiegel, who visited the Chicago office 
on four or five occasions during Quist’s employment and encountered Quist during her 
visits to the Miami office in March 2006 and March 2007. Quist contends that Spiegel 
often talked about sex in conversations with her; told Quist that she sounded like a 
‘bimbo’ and needed blonde hair; leered at Quist and hugged her inappropriately; made
2
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comments about other female employees’ appearances around Ms. Quist; walked 
around his office partially nude in front of other employees; and urinated in his office 
bathroom with the door open. Quist also testified that another S&U employee, Kevin 
Hess, sent Quist e-mails telling her that she was a “complete mess” and berated her for 
her job performance. Pl.’s Rule 56.1(b)(3) Resp. ^ 23.
Finally, Quist contends that S&U retaliated against her for complaining that she 
had been targeted for discrimination and harassment by S&U employees. Specifically, 
she alleges that she told Spiegel on February 15, 2007 that she was being treated 
differently because of her medical condition. According to Quist, Spiegel responded 
that he thought highly of her and that no one at S&U was discriminating against her. 
Quist also asserts that she sent an e-mail to Spiegel on March 27, 2007 complaining 
that Hess was harassing her. Quist asserts that S&U took no actions to prevent or 
remedy this alleged misconduct at any point before Spiegel terminated her employment 
on June 18, 2007.
Discussion
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court “view[s] the record in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that 
party’s favor.” Trinity Homes LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 629 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 
2010). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In other words, a court may grant summary judgment 
“where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 
non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
3
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587 (1986).
1. Disability discrimination claim
In count one, Quist seeks to recover for S&U’s discrimination against her based 
upon a disabling medical condition. She contends that this condition, cervical cancer 
and/or dysplasia, substantially limited her ability to reproduce. S&U responds that it is 
entitled to summary judgment on count one because Quist cannot show that (1) she 
was disabled within the meaning of the ADA or (2) S&U discriminated against her based 
upon her alleged disability.
a. “Disability”
In assessing whether Quist’s medical condition is a “disability,” the Court applies 
the ADA as it existed prior to the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), which took effect on January 1, 2009 and does 
not apply retroactively. See Fredricksen v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 581 F.3d 516, 521 
n.1 (7th Cir. 2009). The prior version of the ADA defined “disability” as “(A) a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of 
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having 
such an impairment.” EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 546 F.3d 438, 442 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) and 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(g)).
“Whether a particular impairment substantially limits a major life activity is a case- 
specific, individualized inquiry.” Squibb v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 781 (2007).
An impairment is substantially limiting if the person “is either unable to perform a major 
life function, or is significantly restricted in the duration, manner, or condition under 
which the individual can perform a particular major life activity, as compared to the
4
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average person in the general population.” Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 
762 (7th Cir. 2001).
S&U agrees that Quist’s cervical cancer and/or dysplasia constitutes a physical 
impairment under the ADA and that reproduction is a “major life activity” under the ADA. 
It contends, however, that this impairment did not substantially limit Quist’s ability to 
reproduce because Quist became pregnant after her LEEP treatments. Def.’s Mem. at 
6-8; see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998). At the same time, S&U 
agrees that women who undergo LEEP face “some risks” in conceiving or maintaining a 
pregnancy. Pl.’s Rule 56.1(b)(3) Resp. ^ 33; see also Def.’s Mem., Ex. 8 at 2 
(publication of the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists noting that 
LEEP “has been associated with an increased risk of future pregnancy problems” and 
“may make it more difficult to become pregnant”). Further, Quist testified that her 
treating physician advised her that the LEEP treatments significantly limited her 
prospects of becoming pregnant. Quist Dep. 25:1-6 (“I went through and started in vitro 
fertilization. . . . [A]t that point, the possibility of me ever having a child was pretty much 
zero, because [the] doctor said the scarring would probably be so severe, and she said 
they removed 80 [percent] of my cervix.”). Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury 
could conclude that Quist’s medical condition substantially limited her ability to 
reproduce.
b. Evidence of discrimination
A plaintiff may prove discrimination under the ADA using either the direct or 
indirect method of proof. Under the direct method, “the plaintiff may show either direct 
or circumstantial evidence that points to a conclusion that the employer acted as it did
5
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for illegal reasons.” Timmons v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 F.3d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.
2006). Direct evidence is typically “‘an admission by the decision-maker that his actions 
were based upon the prohibited animus’”; circumstantial evidence is “evidence that 
‘allows a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decision-maker.’” Buie v. 
Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rogers v. City of 
Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2003)).
By contrast, to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination indirectly, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) he is disabled under the ADA, (2) he was meeting 
his employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, 
and (4) similarly situated employees without a disability were treated more favorably.” 
Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 2009). If the plaintiff can do so, 
“the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the adverse employment action.” Id. The plaintiff must then show that reason to be 
pretextual. Id.
A reasonable jury could, as indicated earlier, find that Quist was disabled, and it 
is undisputed that she suffered an adverse employment action (termination). As 
discussed below, she has also offered evidence suggesting that she was meeting 
S&U’s legitimate expectations. Quist has offered no evidence, however, that she was 
treated worse than a similarly situated employee without a disability. In her opposition 
brief, Quist identifies no such employee. For this reason, she has not established a 
prima facie case of discrimination under the indirect method of proof.
Quist has, however, shown a genuine issue of fact under the direct method of 
proof. She testified that her superiors at S&U consistently praised her work in the
6
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months preceding her diagnosis. Though S&U contends there were problems with 
Quist’s performance throughout her employment, Quist offers documentary evidence 
that Spiegel and other S&U employees praised her performance consistently between 
May 2006 and February 2007, the month in which she received her diagnosis. See, 
e.g., Pl.’s Rule 56.1(b)(3) Stmt., Exs. 4-28. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury 
could conclude that S&U discriminated against Quist because of her disability. 
Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate on count one.
2. Sexual harassment claim
“To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under Title VII, a plaintiff 
must show that 1) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; 2) the harassment 
was based on her sex; 3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to 
alter the condition of her employment and create a hostile or abusive atmosphere; and 
4) there is a basis for employer liability.” Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 
781, 788 (7th Cir. 2007). S&U does not dispute that Quist has shown that there are 
genuine issues of material fact on the first, second, and fourth elements of the test 
outlined in Boumehdi. Def.’s Mem. at 2-3.
To satisfy the third element of this test, the plaintiff must show that the 
harassment was both objectively and subjectively offensive. Boumehdi, 489 F.3d at 
788. As discussed above, Quist has offered evidence that Spiegel engaged in 
inappropriate physical contact with her and made sexually charged statements to her 
and in the presence of other employees. S&U contends that this conduct was not 
sufficiently pervasive because Spiegel and Quist worked in the same office on only a 
few occasions. The Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find this conduct
7
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severe enough to create a subjectively and objectively hostile atmosphere. Summary 
judgment is thus inappropriate on count two.
3. Retaliation claim
In count three, Quist alleges that S&U retaliated against her for complaining 
about discrimination and harassment on several occasions between February 2007 and 
March 2007. See Compl., Ex. C (e-mail to Spiegel dated March 27, 2007); Pl.’s 
56.1(b)(3) Stmt. ^ 14 (complaint to Spiegel in early March); Def.’s 56.1(A)(3) Stmt. ^ 37 
(complaint to Spiegel on February 15, 2007). S&U contends that Quist has not shown a 
direct causal connection between these complaints and her termination and has not 
established a prima facie case of retaliation for purposes of the indirect method of proof.
A plaintiff may prove retaliation using direct or indirect proof. The direct method 
requires evidence of a protected activity by the employee, adverse action by the 
employer, and a causal connection between the two. Boumehdi, 489 F.3d at 792. The 
plaintiff may also “offer circumstantial evidence of intentional retaliation, including 
evidence of suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, behavior toward or comments 
directed at other employees in the protected group, and other bits and pieces from 
which an inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn.” Id. Under the indirect 
method, a plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) 
the defendant took a materially adverse action against her; (3) the plaintiff was 
performing her job satisfactorily; and (4) the plaintiff was treated worse than a similarly 
situated employee who had not engaged in protected activity. Hill v. Potter, 625 F.3d 
998, 1001 (7th Cir. 2010). The burden then shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory basis for its actions, which the plaintiff must then demonstrate to be
8
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pretextual. Id.
Quist has offered no evidence that any similarly situated employee who did not 
complain about discrimination was treated better than her. As with her discrimination 
claim, Quist supports her retaliation claim without drawing comparisons regarding how 
S&U treated its other employees. See, e.g., Pl.’s Resp. at 8-10 (discussing evidence of 
S&U’s early praise for Quist’s work and its later mistreatment and criticism of her work 
following her diagnosis). Therefore, Quist has not established a prima facie case of 
retaliation via the indirect method.
S&U also asserts that Quist cannot establish retaliation directly because she has 
not presented evidence raising a genuine issue of fact regarding causation. Def.’s 
Mem. at 14. In response, Quist contends that issues of fact remain regarding whether 
S&U began reprimanding her and treating her poorly after her diagnosis. Pl.’s Resp. at 
8-10. As noted above, these disputed facts preclude summary judgment on Quist’s 
discrimination claim. Retaliation and discrimination, however, are distinct claims.
Quist’s evidence that S&U began mistreating her after her diagnosis would, as the Court 
has determined, permit a reasonable jury to find that S&U discriminated against her 
based upon her medical condition. It does not, however, create a genuine issue of fact 
regarding the separate question of whether S&U terminated Quist because of her 
complaints about discrimination and harassment. To do so, Quist must offer evidence 
suggesting that her complaints were the cause of the adverse employment actions. 
Boumehdi, 489 F.3d at 792. Evidence that her disability was causally connected to her 
termination does not satisfy this requirement.
The only other evidence that Quist offers in support of a causal connection is that
9
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her termination occurred three to four months after she engaged in protected activity. 
Standing alone, however, suspicious timing “is rarely sufficient to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment.” Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 637 F.3d 729, 736 
(7th Cir. 2011). To be sure, “when considered with other circumstances, the temporal 
proximity between termination and” a plaintiff’s protected activity “may satisfy the 
plaintiff’s burden in some cases.” Goetzke v. Ferro Corp., 280 F.3d 766, 774 (7th Cir. 
2002). Suspicious timing alone can also create a triable issue of fact in “an extreme 
case” where the adverse employment action “comes on the heels of the protected 
activity.” Casna v. City of Loves Park, 574 F.3d 420, 427 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). But Quist has offered no other circumstantial evidence of 
retaliatory motive, such as statements hinting that S&U intended to punish her or 
evidence suggesting that other employees who engaged in protected activity faced 
adverse actions as well. Boumehdi, 489 F.3d at 792.
As a result, Quist’s only evidence is the temporal relationship between her 
complaints and her termination. She made her complaints three to four months before 
S&U fired her. The Seventh Circuit has held that temporal gaps of this length are 
insufficient to show causation. See, e.g., Longstreet v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 276 F.3d 
379, 384 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[Plaintiff’s] only evidence of a connection is the timing; the 
transfer occurred 4 months after the second complaint. This is insufficient.”); Sauzek v. 
Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 202 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Because plaintiffs have 
shown no evidence other than the three month gap between their EEOC charges and 
Exxon’s decision not to rehire them, one could not reasonably conclude that the two 
events are causally related to one another”).
10
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For these reasons, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that 
S&U retaliated against Quist for her complaints by terminating her employment.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated below, the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment [docket no. 30] as to count three and denies it as to counts one and two. The 
case is set for a status hearing on July 11, 2011 at 9:30 a.m. for the purposes of setting 
a trial date and discussing the possibility of settlement.
Date: July 1, 2011
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY 
United States District Judge
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